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The past decade has witnessed a proliferation of texts on trade and pollution.  Compared to this 
rapidly expanding literature, there are relatively few contributions on trade and renewable 
resource management.1   This imbalance in the economics literature is not readily explained by 
lack of popular interest.  The impact of trade liberalization on renewable resource management 
and conservation is a highly contentious issue – fiercely debated outside of academia by 
international bodies (e.g., the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species, the 
International Tropical Timber Organization, the World Trade Organization and the World Bank), 
non-governmental organizations (e.g., TRAFFIC, the World Wildlife Fund (WWF), Greenpeace 
and Friends of the Earth), and the popular media (e.g., The Wall Street Journal, The Economist, 
The Environment, and New Scientist).  Mass demonstrations against globalization and the freeing 
of world trade in recent years in Genoa, Copenhagen, Seattle and other cities hosting meetings of 
international policymakers dominated the news worldwide, and the alleged negative impact of 
free trade on environmental resources was a major theme during these demonstrations. 
While the topic ‘trade and renewable resources’ might be capable of arousing strong 
emotions of the public, it is a fair question to ask whether it is sufficiently different from other 
fields in economics to warrant attention as a separate and emerging academic field (albeit 
obviously an applied one).  We argue that this is indeed the case.  Compared to the literature on 
trade and agriculture, environment or exhaustible resources, the economics literature on trade 
and renewable resources stands apart because of at least three reasons:  i) the key role played by 
the institutional context as reflected in the resource management regime (i.e., optimal 
management vs open access); ii) the inherently dynamic nature of resource management, with 
stock size adjusting over time to the opposing forces of replenishment and harvesting; and 
finally, iii)  the associated complex environmental issues beyond concern with just resource 
extraction (e.g., habitat conversion, non-use values, bio-invasions, biodiversity, etc.).  Many 
resource stocks are not simply a production factor for the traded commodity at hand; they may 
also contribute to the stability and productivity of ecological systems that provide invaluable 
services to mankind, and affect the welfare of individuals directly.  
                                                 
1 For instance, two recent surveys on renewable resource management in the Journal of Economic Literature and 
Journal of Environmental Economics and Management don’t mention this topic (Brown 2000; Wilen 2000). 
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Imperfectly defined or enforced property rights and failure to internalize all external 
effects in extraction implies that natural resource management typically takes place in a “second-
best world.” Ever since pioneering work by Lipsey and Lancaster (1956), economists know that 
trade liberalization in the presence of pre-existing distortions might yield ambiguous welfare 
results.  The second-best nature of resource management makes it a particularly interesting topic 
for economic research on the effect of trade liberalization. 
We suggest that there are two distinct, albeit not necessarily conflicting, views on the 
relationship between trade and renewable resources.  These two perspectives reflect the focal 
points of ecology and economics as scientific disciplines.  Ecologists are typically interested in 
maintaining the integrity of ecosystems and ecological functions, whereas economists are often 
assumed to care predominantly about human welfare.  In recent times, however, these two 
perspectives are increasingly converging.  For example, for many environmental management 
problems, economists frequently consider ecological functions, or “services”, to be important 
arguments in welfare functions.  Equally, ecologists are realizing that protecting and enhancing 
ecosystems requires understanding and controlling the way in which humans exploit these 
systems to enhance their welfare. As will become apparent in our review of the economics 
literature on trade and renewable resources, recent advances in this field are increasingly 
adopting an integrated economic-ecological perspective to analyzing this topic.  Unfortunately, 
when it comes to the impact of international trade on the environment, the popular perception is 
that the views of some economists and some ecologists are still at polar extremes. 
Consider these typical positions taken by antagonists and protagonists of free trade.  
Environmentalists often espouse the “anti-free trade” view, which as summarized by Daly and 
Goodland (1994), centers around concerns about economic scale relative to ecological limits, 
distribution, the balance of power between multinational enterprises and national governments, 
and the implied effects of globalization on incentives for domestic governments to regulate 
resource use.  The WWF (1999), for example, argues that the World Trade Organization (WTO) 
threatens the environment and believes it is no coincidence that “the Earth has lost 30 percent of 
its natural wealth” at the same time “the volume of world trade is 14 times greater than it was in 
1950, and is growing at twice the pace of other economic activities.” Trade boosts production, 
consumption and transport – all of which is at the detriment of resource systems.  Trade 
liberalization undermines important environmental treaties, and might set the stage for a 
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regulatory ‘race to the bottom’ in response to concerns about the private sector’s competitiveness 
on international markets.  In addition, trade liberalization is claimed to potentially affect the 
social fabric of rural communities managing common property resources, undermining local 
institutions geared towards sustainable resource management.  Causal observation of the 
devastating impact of the ivory trade on elephant populations, or the effect of the tropical timber 
trade on forest management in the Philippines or Ivory Coast, lends some credibility to the 
concerns of environmentalists. 
The response of the caricature economist, in contrast, is that trade is unambiguously 
“good.”  By exploiting scale economies or differences in technologies, factor endowments or 
preferences, trade essentially relaxes a binding constraint and enhances welfare.  While the first-
order effects of trade liberalization on resource management and stock conservation are likely to 
be ambiguous, all participating countries will experience Pareto-improving gains when 
conditions for a Walrasian economy are satisfied.  Thus any “losers” from the resource impacts 
arising from trade liberalization could be potentially compensated by the “winners” in the rest of 
the economy.  Of course, economists acknowledge that actual economies do not satisfy 
Walrasian conditions.  But the general perception is that, if trade does trigger substantial damage 
to the environment, such outcomes are typically associated with the presence of domestic 
distortions.  Various case studies on trade and renewable resources seem to support this view.  
For example, the ivory trade only resulted in excessive elephant slaughtering because property 
rights to elephants (and ivory) were not enforced, and range states had no incentive to protect 
and harvest this resource in a sustainable manner (Barbier et al 1990).  Likewise, the timber trade 
only ravaged Philippine forests because corrupt policy makers had easy access to tempting rents 
(Ross 2001).  Economists argue that the right response in such cases is to address the underlying 
problem through domestic regulation or environmental treaties, and not to restrict trade.  Quite to 
the contrary, economists often argue that trade is good for conservation through the 
“environmental Kuznets curve” (EKC) argument – trade stimulates economic growth, and richer 
people demand more conservation of stocks which higher income countries can now afford to 
protect.  Similarly, trade can provide the incentives for regulators to manage their resource base 
more carefully, because higher prices for the resource may imply a “pay off” for such a strategy 
(Swanson 1994).  For example, although excessive timber-related deforestation is a major 
problem in many tropical forest countries, Barbier (2001, p. 147) argues that “producer countries 
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that take a long-term perspective on the development of their forest industries and through 
sustainable management of their forests are likely to gain substantially from the expanding 
international trade in timber products.” 
In light of such opposing views it is no surprise that there are repeated calls for 
incorporating trade rules for improved resource management into the WTO.  However, as 
pointed out by Copeland and Taylor (2003, p2), “there is a rather large gap between what we 
know about the relationship between international trade and renewable resource management, 
and what we would need to know in order to evaluate policy proposals, design new international 
treaties, or amend WTO obligations.”  Similarly, while multilaterial conventions like the 
Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of wild fauna and flora (CITES) and 
the Convention on Biological Diversitas (CBD) have recently embraced the use of economic 
incentives to promote sustainable and efficient use of resources and wildlife, there is a lack of 
insight in how to make progress on this front.   
The main objective of the paper is to provide a survey of the current literature, and 
discuss state of the art knowledge about the impact of trade liberalization on (i) the incentive to 
invest in stock conservation and (ii) welfare in resource-dependent economies.  When stepping 
back from the theoretical Walrasian economy to allow for the existence of policy and market 
imperfections, we find that trade liberalization generally has ambiguous effects in terms of both 
impacts.  Opening up for trade can increase welfare but when institutions are imperfect it might 
just as likely have the opposite effect.  Similarly, environmentalists are sometimes right to fret 
about the consequences of trade for resource management, but there exist circumstances where 
trade promotes conservation and where banning trade could be detrimental and puts species at 
risk.  Another objective of the current paper, therefore, is to demonstrate the conditions which 
produce outcomes that conform to either the typical economist’s or environmentalist’s view of 
trade and the environment, and to search for common ground between these two positions. 
The importance of gaining a better understanding of the impact of trade on management 
of renewable resources is underscored by the simple observation that exports of key renewable 
resources continue to increase.  Bourke and Leitch (2000) note that forestry has become a global 
activity (with ownership of forests and plans, concession rights increasingly held by foreign 
companies), and that exports of most forest products, as well as their value, have expanded 
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considerably over the past 25 years.2  Similarly, Vannuccini (2003) writes that some 40% of 
world fish production enters international trade, and that net exports of developing countries 
grew from US$4 billion in 1981 to US$ 17.7 billion in 2001.  Within global trends there have 
been changes in the importance of different countries as exporters – for example, as the pattern 
of the timber trade shifts to value-added processed products such as wood pulp and paper, wood-
based panels, and furniture, developing countries such as Indonesia, Malaysia, Brazil, Chile and 
the Asian newly industrializing countries are emerging as leading exporters (Barbier 2001).  
Partly this may be due to changing markets (both domestic and international) and other factors.  
However, this also represents changes in resource conditions because of exactly the processes 
discussed later in this chapter.  For example, Brander and Taylor (1997a,b) argue it is no 
coincidence that countries like the Philippines and Cote d’Ivoire, with imperfect property rights 
to their valuable forest resources, have turned from net exporter to net importer of wood 
products.   
We have organized the paper such that our presentation of the results loosely follows 
historical developments in the literature.  In the 1970s and 1980s, following the rapid spread of 
optimal control methods throughout the resource economics field, most of the work assumed the 
perspective of a benevolent planner who either harvests the resource or controls the harvesting 
by private agents at zero cost.3  The main results of this literature are discussed in section 2.  The 
perspective drastically changed in the 1990s, and there was growing attention to the polar 
opposite case of open access resource extraction.  This firmly places us in a second-best world, 
and salient features of these models are addressed in section 3. North South models are discussed 
in section 4.  Currently the pendulum swings back again, moving from the case where are 
virtually no institutions (open access) to the socially optimal case.  But rather than taking the 
existence of a planner for granted, this new literature treats the institutional context as 
endogenous, following from the incentives and constraints that agents have at the micro level.  
This literature, as well as some other work on intermediate cases between the polar extreme 
cases, is discussed in section 5. The conclusions and recommendations for future research ensue. 
                                                 
2 Globally, exports of industrial roundwood have increased by 22% since 1970 to 120 million cubic meters (cum) in 
1997; sawnwood and wood pulp have almost doubled to 113 million cum and 35 million metric tons, respectively.  
Wood based panels have increased five fold to 50 million cum, and paper and paperboard has quadrupled to 87 
million metric tons. 
3 Of course there are a few very influential papers in the 1950s dealing with open access (Scott, Gordon).  But these 
papers did not deal with trade explicitly, and their main insights were not used in trade models until the 1990s.  
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2. Benchmark 1: optimal management and perfect property rights 
The simplest analysis of trade and renewable resources is not about trade at all.  Rather, it is 
about the consequences of changing the relative price of resource commodities.  In this section 
we take the simple case of optimal resource management in a partial equilibrium setting as a 
starting point, and then gradually complicate the analysis by adding general equilibrium 
considerations, and trade with exogenous and endogenous prices.  Throughout the paper we 
assume that the country in question is ‘resource abundant’ which implies it faces a higher 
resource price after liberalization and becomes a net exporter (at least in the short run).  Of 
course some countries are resource scarce so that the opposite holds, and many of the effects 
discussed below will be reversed.   
 Regardless of whether a country is resource abundant or scarce, the welfare effects of 
trade liberalization under optimal management with perfect property rights must be beneficial.4  
Trade relaxes a binding constraint, and makes society as a whole better off.  As usual, there are 
distributional issues as well – the resource industry and consumers may gain or lose, depending 
on whether the country is resource abundant or scarce.  The impact on producer surplus is readily 
assessed by comparing the rents or profits associated with harvesting at low and high prices.  For 
an optimally managed resource it always holds that raising the price of the resource commodity 
is consistent with increasing the net present value (NPV) of harvesting.  The effect on steady 
state rent is more complex because of the backward bending supply curve that is implied by 
hump-backed growth functions such as the logistic.  While higher prices will unambiguously 
lower the optimal stock in the simple model, the associated equilibrium harvest level may go up 
or down.  
 In the following section we consider the impact of trade liberalization on stock 
conservation in a partial equilibrium context in more detail. 
 
2.1 Single-market bioeconomic model 
                                                 
4 Maintaining the renewable resource stock is also likely to generate wider social values, or “stock externalities”, 
such as biodiversity values, watershed protection, carbon sequestration and nonuse values.  These values can be 
incorporated in the model by including the resource stock, S, as a direct argument in the welfare function, typically 
increasing the optimal resource stock in equilibrium.  Failing to account for externalities (such that suboptimal 
management is taking place) implies that welfare effects of a change in the terms of trade are generally ambiguous 
(Anderson and Blackhurst 1992).  This is demonstrated formally in a model of renewable resource management and 
trade by Barbier and Schulz (1997). 
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Consider the most basic bioeconomic model where a planner maximizes the net present value of 
welfare from harvesting a resource stock, and where the resource commodity is initially only 
traded domestically.  Assume that harvesting (H) is defined by the well-known Schaefer 
production function (time arguments are omitted for convenience): 
(1)  H = qES, 
where q is a parameter (the so-called catchability coefficient), E is aggregate extraction effort (a 
control variable for the planner) and S is the extant resource stock, growing over time according 
to a logistic function .  This defines the equation of motion for the stock:  
(2)   dS/dt = G(S) – H = γS(1-S/K) – qES, 
where γ and K are parameters (for now), representing the intrinsic growth rate and carrying 
capacity, respectively.  Under autarky, the price received per unit of the resource varies 
according to the inverse demand function p = D(H) with D′<0.  The planner maximizes the 
discounted sum of consumer surplus and resource rent associated with this sector, and his current 
value Hamiltonian (Ηc) reads as: 






])([)( λ , 
where λ is the shadow price of the resource stock, c represents the per unit cost of harvesting 
effort, and where we have used E=H/qS (from (1)).  The necessary conditions for an interior 
steady state (with constant resource stock and shadow price) are: 
(4)  H* = G(S*), and 









where r is the interest rate, and (*) denotes an optimal value.  According to equation (4), any 
stock growth should always be harvested and equation (5) defines that, at the margin, the return 
to a unit of the resource in situ should equal the exogenous return on investments elsewhere in 
the economy.  Condition (5) implies that the rate of return of the renewable resource may be 
broken up in two parts: the impact of a change in the stock on growth, and the impact of a 
change in stock on harvesting costs (see Clark 1990 for details). 
 What happens to extraction in the resource sector when this economy is opened up for 
trade?  Assume that we are talking about a small economy that faces an infinitely elastic demand 
function, or an exogenous world price p for the traded resource commodity.  With net benefits of 
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extraction re-defined to account for the fixed price as B = pH – cE (i.e. the government now only 
considers resource rents or profits for producers), the equilibrium condition that defines the 
optimal stock, denoted by (^), becomes: 









The implications of opening for trade for domestic stock conservation in equilibrium are now 
straightforward.  In this simple context they boil down to the question whether the new price p is 
greater or smaller than the one under autarky defined by D(H*).  Since the growth function is 
strictly concave (G′′<0), it follows that in equilibrium dS/dp<0.  Therefore it holds that the 
domestic resource stock will (i) be unaffected if by accident p=D(H*) holds, (ii) be augmented 
whenever p<D(H*), and (iii) be smaller whenever p>D(H*) holds.  For a resource-abundant 
country, therefore, the stock will fall after opening up for trade. 
 This unambiguous result has been used to interpret the effect of trade measures on 
resource conservation.  For example, if restricting international trade in sea horses, ivory, exotic 
pets or tropical timber lowers the net price received by exporters (through a tariff), equation (5′) 
predicts that as a result the stock will increase.  Trade sanctions appear to “work” in this case. 
However, it is clear from this simple model that this outcome depends on some rather 
restrictive assumptions.  For example, Barbier and Rauscher (1994) demonstrate that a more 
realistic model that allows for a positive resource stock externality (e.g. biodiversity benefits) as 
well as extraction for both export and domestic consumption will lead to an ambiguous trade 
policy outcome.  That is, one can no longer be certain that any trade intervention such as a ban or 
a trade tariff that lowers the terms of trade of the resource-exporting economy will always 
increase the long-run equilibrium resource stock of the economy.  As we show next, other 
important extensions to the single-market model, such as incorporating the opportunity cost of 
habitat conservation, also indicate that trade sanctions are unlikely to “work” unambiguously in 
terms of enhancing long-run resource stocks. 
 
2.2 Adding opportunity costs of habitat 
The basic model in 2.1 assumes that the only alternative to not harvesting a species is to leave it 
unexploited.  This implies that the model is more suitable to analyze the case of managing 
marine systems (mainly fisheries) and trade, but less applicable to the case of terrestrial systems 
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where alternative uses to land than just nature conservation exist. If the social planner in the 
economy does consider the opportunity cost of setting aside land as habitat in order to maintain 
the resource stock, foregoing potential returns from, say, agriculture or plantation forestry, then 
resource conservation in the long run will be affected.   
To capture such effects, the basic model can be extended to include two sectors, e.g. 
agriculture and forestry, which are dependent on the same resource base, e.g. land or habitat area.   
In essence, such an extension now creates a 2 x 1 (two sectors and one factor) model of the small 
open economy, as land or habitat conversion by the non-traded sector (agriculture) affects 
production from the traded sector dependent on renewable resource exploitation (forestry).  Such 
a model is especially important for analyzing a small open economy dependent on exploitation of 
terrestrial-based renewable resources for export (e.g. timber or wildlife products), which is 
threatened by widespread land conversion to another economic activity (e.g. agriculture).  In 
developing economies, such a model is relevant to analyzing agricultural conversion of wildlife 
and biodiversity habitat (Barbier and Schulz 1997; Swanson 1994) and forestland (Barbier and 
Burgess 1997), or aquaculture conversion of mangroves (Barbier 2003).  
 If the economy takes into account this opportunity cost, then in the long run it will 
conserve less of the resource stock (i.e., S* is lower).  As demonstrated by Barbier and Schulz 
(1997), including the opportunity cost of conserving land to maintain the resource stock, implies 
that the comparative static effects of increasing the relative price of the resource commodity are 
now ambiguous.  This leads to two opposite effects.  On the one hand, the result will be 
increased exploitation of the resource stock as exports become more profitable; on the other, 
there is now less pressure to increase habitat conversion, as the value of wild lands (supporting 
replenishment of the valuable resource) increases.  If the latter effect is strong, then banning or 
restricting trade is counter-productive as it triggers habitat conversion, undermining the system’s 
ability to support the key resource in the long run.5  Barbier et al (1990) use this as an important 
argument against banning the trade in ivory to protect elephants.6  A similar argument suggests 
                                                 
5 Adding to the ambiguity, when there are nonuse values associated with the stock, then income effects may play a 
role as well – extra revenues from resource sales may lower the marginal utility of consumption and increase 
demand of “nature.”   
6 Bulte and van Kooten (1999) analyse the ivory trade ban in case in more detail, solving a Stackelberg game 
between regulator and poachers.  There are damages associated with elephant conservation (akin to the opportunity 
cost of habitat).  It is shown that the trade ban lowers elephant numbers when discount rates applied by African 
range states are sufficiently low (below 5%) and that the reverse holds when discount rates are “high.”  The impact 
of the trade ban on the regulator’s incentive to enforce anti-poaching regulation is further discussed in section 5. 
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that trade sanctions on tropical timber products could actually further deforestation in exporting 
countries, as trade bans and punitive tariffs would increase the returns to agricultural conversion, 
which is the major cause of much tropical deforestation globally (Barbier 2001; Barbier et al. 
1994). 
 
2.3 The 2 x 2 small open economy  
The small open economy model with renewable resources can be extended to a two-
sector, two-factor (2 x 2) model.  Such a model was developed by Kemp and Long (1984) to 
examine the conditions under which a small open economy may choose to specialize in 
production and exports of a relatively resource-intensive good or in a relatively labor-intensive 
good.7  The resource harvesting process they consider is somewhat simpler than the one 
discussed above as the authors consider only the aggregate amount of resource extracted and thus 
harvesting costs are assumed independent of stock size.  For the optimal stock in equilibrium, 
then, it must hold that G’(S) = r, or marginal growth of the wild stock must equal the discount 
rate. 
For a small open economy the task is to choose the rate of harvest, H, so as to maximize: 




subject to dS/dt = G(S) – H.  In (6), Y represents the aggregate output of the two-sector economy, 
which is a function of the terms of trade, harvest and the total endowment of the Ricardian labor 
factor, L.  Both goods are produced with constant returns to scale technology. The terms of trade, 
p, represents the relative price of good 1 in terms of good 2, i.e. p = P1/P2, with the second good 
being the relative resource-intensive good.  For given p constant, Kemp and Long consider how 
aggregate output, Y, changes with increases in the harvest rate.  Over a defined interval ( )HH ,  
the economy produces both the labor- and resource-intensive goods as the value marginal 
product of labor in production is the same.  Over this interval, the aggregate output function is 
linear with respect to H (i.e., ∂Y/∂H is constant), and this interval defines the  “threshold” for the 
economy to switch from specializing in one type of good to the other.  Outside of this interval, 
                                                 
7  Unlike the two-sector, two-factor (2 x 2) model of open access management (pioneered by Brander and Taylor 
1997, and discussed below) it is assumed that both factors are combined to produce the two goods. 
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the economy specializes in one of the goods and Y has the normal concavity properties with 
respect to harvest. 
 Kemp and Long demonstrate that in the steady state, which is a saddle point, it may be 
optimal for the economy to produce and export only the labor-intensive good, only the resource-
intensive good, or produce both goods.  However, as the economy passes along one or other of 
the stable arms towards the saddle, production may switch from one pattern of specialization to 
another during the approach dynamics.   
For example, Figure 1 illustrates the case where the economy specializes in the labor-
intensive good (which does not imply that harvests are zero).  The saddle path and equilibrium 
are depicted in (λ, S) space, where as before λ is the shadow price of the resource stock.  As 
shown in Figure 1, the switching threshold occurs well below the steady state (λ*, S*).  It follows 
that, if the economy begins with relatively low resource stocks, S < S*, then it will follow the 
left-hand arm of the saddle path and always specialize in the labor-intensive good.  In contrast, if 
the economy is relatively resource abundant initially, S > S*, then the economy will specialize 
first in producing and exporting the resource-intensive good but will switch eventually to 
specializing in the labor-intensive good.  Note that, along this right-hand arm of the saddle path, 
the economy continues to over-exploit the resource stock, which eventually declines to the 
steady state level S*. 
Kemp and Long also consider the effects of an increase in the terms of trade, p, i.e. an 
increase in the price of the relatively resource-intensive good.  The result is an increase in the 
interval of time during which the relatively resource-intensive good is produced and exported, 
and a decrease in the time in which the economy specializes in the labor-intensive good.  In 





, and if this effect 
is sufficiently large so that this line now exceeds the steady state (λ*, S*), then it is possible that a 
small open economy will specialize in the resource-intensive good or produce both goods. 
The Kemp and Long model is clearly a highly simplified 2 x 2 model of a small open 
economy.  No consideration is made of the opportunity cost of habitat, stock externalities or even 
the cost of resource harvesting.  Nevertheless, the conditions under which a small open economy 
may choose to specialize in production and exports of a relatively resource-intensive good or in a 
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relatively labor-intensive good prove an important contrast to other models of resource-trade 
relationships.    
For example, Matsuyama (1992) showed how trade liberalization may lower welfare in 
model with external benefits in the non-resource (or non-agricultural) sector – a departure from 
the first best world discussed thus far.  If there are increasing returns at the sector level due the 
spillover benefits of firms, then re-allocation of labor from manufacturing to resource extraction 
will lower the returns of firms that remain in manufacturing (an external cost that will be ignored 
by individuals).  If opening up for trade induces such a re-allocation of labor, then total welfare 
may fall.  This effect has been postulated as one potential explanation of the so-called resource 
curse effect – an empirical regularity suggesting that countries well endowed with resources tend 
to grow slower than their resource poor counterparts.8 
 
3.  The polar opposite benchmark: open access 
One of the most important institutional frameworks to consider in a trade-renewable resource 
model is the situation of “unregulated common property” or “open access”.  There is a long 
tradition in bioeconomic models of the fishery in analyzing open access problems, beginning 
with the seminal works by Gordon (1954), Scott (1955) and Smith (1969).  As Conrad (1995, p. 
408) notes, “a fishery is open access when the fish stock is harvested by a large number of 
unregulated, competitive fishermen with no barrier to entry or exit … de facto open access can 
arise if management regulations are ineffective.  These might occur, over time, if fishermen are 
adaptive and can reduce or eliminate the effect of regulations which previously restricted catch.” 
In recent years, there has been increased recognition that the “open access” resource 
management problem extends beyond fisheries to other renewable resources, notably forests, 
wildlife, mangroves and other terrestrial-based resources.  Only recently, however, have the 
implications of open access for the impacts of trade on renewable resource management been 
explored.   
However, not all trade-renewable resource models that incorporate open access resource 
exploitation necessarily arrive at the same conclusions.  The results for resource conservation 
                                                 
8 This effect is more likely to eventuate when countries are rich in point resources (like oil fields and mines) than in 
diffuse resources such as agricultural land (see Leite and Weidman 1999, Isham et al 2003).  Other possible 
explanations for the resource curse include Dutch disease (Sachs and Warner 1997), and rent seeking (Torvik 2002), 
and also the potential adverse effect of resource wealth on institutional development, indirectly impacting on 
economic performance (Isham et al. 2003). 
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and welfare differ depending on whether models are constructed in a partial or general 
equilibrium setting, and depending on assumptions regarding market structure, technology and 
scale economies.  To illustrate these models, we adopt a similar approach as in discussing trade-
renewable resource models under optimal resource management.  First we consider the simplest 
case of a single-market bioeconomic model.  We then examine the case of the 2 x 2 model of a 
small open economy.  The discussion of North-South models that incorporate various 
assumptions concerning open access resource exploitation will be discussed in Section 4. 
 
3.1 Single-market bioeconomic model 
 As a counterpart to the basic single-market model optimal management model developed 
in Section 2.1, consider now the same model under open access exploitation.  As demonstrated 
by Smith (1969) and Conrad (1995), the key feature of the latter model is that aggregate 
extraction effort, E, is determined by the profits generated by resource extraction.  That is, an 
increase in profits will lead to greater extraction in the open access industry, whereas a decline in 
profits will reduce extraction.  This suggests that the dynamics of effort in open access resource 
extraction, both for autarky and free trade, can be represented by the following equation of 
motion: 
 (7) ( )[ ]EcqSHDE −φ= . 
This differential condition implies that expectations are constantly adapting in response to 
observations in the field – some kind of “backward looking” behavior (for a model of rational 
expectations, see Berck and Perloff 1982).   
We need to combine (7) with an equation that defines the dynamics of the resource stock.  
As before, we can assume both a logistic stock growth function for G(S), and Schaefer harvest, H 
= qSE.  This implies that stock dynamics are represented by equation (2) above. 
Under autarky, the price received per unit of the resource varies according to the inverse 
demand function, p = D(H) with D' < 0.  Thus equation (7) indicates how exploitation effort 
adjusts, at some rate φ, to the profits from harvesting.  In the long run, under open access, profits 
from exploitation are driven to zero and the renewable resource stock is constant.   The long-run 
steady state is therefore 
(8) 
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where the superscript "A" is used to denote open access equilibrium values.  The long-run steady 
state and the dynamic path corresponding to this state is depicted in Figure 2 for the case where 
the price elasticity of demand, ( ) ( )HHDHD ′=ε , is elastic, i.e. 1>ε .   
 Once again, it is insightful to see what happens to extraction in the resource sector when 
the economy is opened for trade.  If the economy is small, then it faces an exogenous world 
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which is a vertical line in Figure 2.  The implications of opening for trade for resource 
conservation are straightforward and similar to the optimal management case, in that they once 
again depend on whether the new price p is greater or smaller than the price received under 
autarky defined by D(HA).  That is, the domestic resource stock will be (i) unaffected if by 
accident p=D(HA) holds, (ii) augmented whenever p<D(HA), and (iii) smaller whenever 
p>D(HA) holds.   
Assuming that prices rise as a consequence of opening up for trade, it follows that the 
resource stock will fall.9  The latter effect is depicted in Figure 2, where the new open access 
equilibrium for the resource stock is indicated as SA’’. As also shown in Figure 2, however, 
equilibrium effort will rise, to EA’.10  Thus in the simple bioeconomic model, the stock and 
harvest effects of opening up of trade are the same in the open case as in optimal management.  
However, these two cases do differ in one important respect.  Under open access, all rents from 
resource extraction are dissipated in the long run.  Opening up the economy for trade does not 
affect this outcome; rent in the steady state is zero and remains so.  In other words, there are no 
welfare effects (in terms of changes in producer surplus) in the resource sector.  
 The open access model has been extended to include the impacts of habitat conversion 
(e.g. Bulte and Horan 2003).  For example, Barbier and Strand (1998) consider a model of an 
export-oriented shrimp fishery in Campeche, Mexico that produces shrimp for export.  
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According to ecological evidence, the fishery is supported by coastal mangrove systems that 
serve as breeding and nursery habitat for the shrimp fry.  Thus, by assuming that increasing 
mangrove area F effectively "extends" the carrying capacity of the fishery, Barbier and Strand 
modify the net growth equation (2) to 
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Starting with an open access equilibrium under trade conditions (i.e. point (SA’, EA’) in Figure 2), 
Barbier and Strand show that the effect of threats to mangrove habitat, through coastal 
developments in Campeche, is to reduce equilibrium effort in the fishery, but leave the resource 
stocks unchanged.  This is shown in Figure 2 by the rotating down of the 0=S curve.  The 
destruction of mangrove habitat creates a temporary disequilibrium in which stocks fall and so 
does harvest.  Because export prices remain unchanged, a loss is made in the fishery causing 
some fishers to leave so that effort declines.  This will mean less exploitation so stocks will 
recover, and in the long run zero profits prevail once again.  Thus in the new equilibrium, stocks 
return to their steady state level, SA’, but effort has fallen (i.e. EA < EA’).  The result must be lower 
levels of harvest and gross revenues in the fishery.11 
 In general, if a small open economy is exploiting and exporting a renewable resource 
under open access conditions, we would expect habitat conversion to have similar effects.  This 
is readily apparent from (9’) and (10).  If a reduction in natural habitat (i.e. a decline in F) shifts 
down the growth function, either by reducing K RU  WKHQ VWHDG\-state effort and thus harvest 
will fall but not steady-state resource stocks.    
 
3.2 The 2 x 2 small open economy  
Brander and Taylor (1997a) construct a 2 x 2 model of a small open economy by 
combining an open access renewable resource model with a standard Ricardian model of 
international trade.12  One of the two goods is a resource good produced using labor and the 
                                                 
11 Barbier and Strand employ this model, under the assumption that the fishery is a price-taker in export markets, to 
estimate the long-run losses from mangrove deforestation on the open access shrimp fishery in Campeche.  See 
Barbier (2003) for the example of applying the model with a finite elasticity of demand to a case study in Thailand 
of the impacts of the expansion of aquaculture shrimp, a leading export product, on mangrove conversion and off-
shore fisheries.  The analysis demonstrates why Thailand has chosen to expand coastal aquaculture to increase 
export earnings from shrimp production, despite the economic consequences of the accompanying mangrove 
deforestation for coastal fisheries. 
12 Qualitatively similar results are obtained for a 2 x 2 x 2 model (see Brander and Taylor 1998). 
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resource stock.  The other good is a generic "manufactures" good produced using labor.  Brander 
and Taylor consider such a model to be applicable to understanding the effects of international 
trade on open access renewable resource exploitation, and believe that the insights of such a 
model are particularly relevant to small open developing economies.  Over-exploitation of many 
renewable natural resources – particularly the conversion of forests to agricultural land – often 
occurs in developing countries because property rights over a resource stock are hard to define, 
difficult to enforce or costly to administer.  
The country has a fixed labor force and produces and consumes two goods.  The 
"manufactures" good, M, is treated as the numeraire whose price is normalized to one.  In this 
constant returns to scale sector (but see below), one unit of labor is used to produce one unit of M 
and, hence, labor's value marginal product in manufacturing is also one.  It follows that, given 
competitive labor markets, the wage rate in the economy is one if both goods are produced.  The 
second good is harvest, H, from a renewable resource stock, which is subject to the standard net 
biological growth relationship.  Harvest is produced with the Schaefer production function 
H=qES, and the labor constraint implies L=E+M. The effect of open access exploitation in the 
resource sector is to ensure that the price of the resource good must equal its unit cost of 
production in equilibrium.  That is, as all rents from using the resource stock are dissipated, and 









where p is the (relative) price of the resource good.  Equation (11) states that, under open access, 
the price of the resource good must equal its unit cost of production.  Since the wage rate, w, in 
the economy is one (with diversified production), the unit labor requirements, and thus costs, of 
the resource sector are inversely related to the size of the stock. 
 To complete their model, Brander and Taylor assume a representative consumer endowed 
with one unit of labor, who has Cobb-Douglas preferences for both goods (u=HβM1-β).  As this 
implies that both goods are essential, in autarky manufactures, M, must be also be produced.  The 
authors show that the ratio of the resource’s intrinsic growth rate (γ) to total labor in the 
economy, γ/L, determines autarky relative prices.  This ratio defines Ricardian "comparative 
advantage".  Thus for some sufficiently high ratio of γ/L a country would have an autarky price 
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of the resource good less than the world price and can be considered relatively "resource 
abundant".  For γ/L > q, the small economy may specialize in manufactures or the resource good 
(depending on relative prices) or be characterized by diversified production.  For γ/L < q it is 
impossible for the country to specialize in the resource sector. 
 Figure 3 illustrates the effects of opening of trade in a resource-abundant economy – a 
country where prices under autarky were below the world market level p* (or a country where 
γ/L is sufficiently large).  Figure 3a compares the initial post-trade impacts and the transition to 
the steady state, whereas Figure 3b contrasts steady state utility under autarky with various trade 
scenarios.   Denoting pA and SA as the autarky equilibrium resource price and stock respectively, 
we have from (11) A
A qSp 1= as the initial condition describing this equilibrium.  In Figure 3a, 
the initial autarky production and consumption point is given by E, with β and (1 - β) 
representing the share of labor employed in the resource and manufacturing sectors respectively.  
The production possibility frontier under autarky is the steep line with intercept LqSA that goes 
through point E.  If p* > pA when trade opens (world market prices exceeding prior domestic 
prices under autarky), then the economy immediately specializes in the resource good.  The 
condition 1* >AqSp  implies that the value marginal product of labor in harvesting exceeds the 
prevailing domestic wage in the resource sector.  The temporary equilibrium production point 
moves to the vertical axis at LqSA, and the economy's initial post-trade budget line has a slope – 
1/p* (represented by the dotted line in Figure 3), and it lies outside the autarky production 
possibility frontier.  This implies that the economy exports initially the resource good, imports 
manufactures and experiences temporary gains from trade as the new consumption point is now 
C. 
 However, the initial trading equilibrium cannot be sustained.  All labor has entered the 
resource sector, which will result in the temporary harvest rate rising above the steady-state 
autarky level.  The harvest rate will exceed resource growth, and S will decline.  As the resource 
stock falls, Schaefer production implies that harvests will also decline, and as shown in Figure 
3a, the vertical intercept of the production possibility frontier shifts down as indicated by the 
arrows.  Two possible steady-state outcomes may result.   
First, if the resource stock stabilizes at a level that can sustain the entire labor force at a 
wage rate exceeding one, then the economy can specialize in production and export of the 
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resource good in the long run.  This is indicated by one line if Figure 3a, which is the small 
country’s free-trade budget line that has a vertical intercept, and production level, of LqSS and a 
intercept on the horizontal axis beyond L.  As depicted in the figure, the specialized steady state 
would allow the country to gain from trade. However, this need not be the case.  Steady-state 
consumption levels under complete trade specialization may not necessarily be higher than in 
autarky, and depending on the relationship between the terms of trade and steady-state utility, the 
economy may or may not have gained from trade. 
Figure 3a also illustrates the case of steady-state diversification.  In this case, the resource 
stock falls to a level, SD, so that not all the labor is allocated to harvesting and its value marginal 
product equals one.  The economy will consume at point D, and in comparison to autarky, 
international trade reduces the small country’s steady-state utility unambiguously.  While 
nominal income is unaffected by the opening up for trade, real income has fallen as the consumer 
price of the resource is now higher than before. 
Figure 3b illustrates the consequences of trade for a resource-abundant economy, γ/L > q.  
The flat line labeled uA represents the country’s steady-state per capita utility under autarky, 
whereas uT represents the country’s steady state utility under trade, which is a function of 
different world prices, p*, for the resource good.  The standard gains from trade are a convex 
function of the difference between the world and autarky price, and are minimized if the world 
price equals the autarky price (pA = p*).  In that case, trading and autarky utility are also equal.  
At all prices below pA the economy would export manufactures and experience steady-state gains 
from trade.  There is some possible world price p1*, such that world prices below this level the 
economy would stop being diversified and specialize completely in manufactures.  At world 
prices just above pA the economy would be an exporter of the resource good but diversified in 
production.  In this range, steady-state utility under trade would be less than it would be under 
autarky.  However, if world prices rise to p2*, the economy would specialize in the production of 
the resource good.  This price level minimizes steady-state utility under trade.  Above p2* 
additional increases in the world price are beneficial to the economy, and there is some price, 
p3*, beyond which steady-state gains from trade would occur relative to autarky. 
The problem highlighted by Brander and Taylor is that too much harvesting takes place 
in autarky because there are no secure property rights to the resource.  Opening up for trade 
makes matters worse for resource abundant countries.  Conversely, resource scarce countries are 
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better off as they now start importing the resource good. Brander and Taylor conclude that, as the 
problem lies with the open access nature of exploitation in the resource-abundant economy, then 
the first-best policy would be for the small open country to switch to more efficient resource 
management policy through simply establishing property rights.13  However, as they 
acknowledge, there are many policy and institutional distortions that currently work against such 
solutions, particularly in developing countries and other resource-abundant small open 
economies.  Consequently, Brander and Taylor (1997a, p. 550) argue in favor of “second best 
approaches.”  In a dynamic context where alternative assets are available, the exporting country 
could impose “a modified Hartwick's rule” (see Hartwick 1977) and re-invest temporary gains 
from selling a resource good on world markets.14 
In an extension to the analysis by Brander and Taylor, Hannesson (2000) demonstrates 
that their results may depend critically on the assumption that the manufactures good sector is 
constant returns to scale.  For example, in Brander and Taylor's model, the steady state national 
income in terms of manufactures does not change, as long as the country does not specialize 
fully in open access resource extraction.  However, Hannesson argues that it is not at all unlikely 
for economies heavily dependent on extractive industries and with a locational disadvantage in 
manufacturing to have diminishing returns in the latter sector.  As a consequence, the 
equilibrium national income of a small open economy in terms of manufactures is likely to rise 
from trade, even if harvested exports are exploited under open access, as the country is now able 
to import manufactures a constant world price rather than having to acquire these goods through 
reallocating resources with diminishing returns.15  By shifting labor from manufacturing to 
harvesting the marginal and average return to labor in manufacturing increases (see also de Meza 
and Gould 1992).  Note that an opposite result obtains when we assume increasing returns to 
scale in manufacturing instead (e.g. Matsuyama 1992).  Increasing returns may be plausible, for 
                                                 
13 But see Emami and Johnston (2000) who demonstrate that, in the context of imperfect property rights, resource 
management by only one country may benefit one or both trading partners, but may also reduce welfare for both, 
when compared to the case in which neither manages its resource sector. 
14 The Brander and Taylor model has been extended to include habitat (as emphasized in section 2) and a third 
sector that demands land (say agriculture) by Smulders et al (2004).  While open access to resource stocks gives rise 
to within–industry externalities, it is shown that habitat destruction may create across–industry externalities.   
15 When the two goods are substitutes, and thus the indifference curves are linear, these gains from trade always 
dominate.  However, with non-linear indifference curves, such as the case with a Cobb-Douglas utility function, the 
gains from trade are more ambiguous, and it is possible to obtain the same results as Brander and Taylor, even with 
diminishing returns in manufacturing.  See Hannesson (2000).  
 21
example, because of spillover benefits in manufacturing – a key assumption in the endogenous 
growth literature. 
Hannesson (2000) also demonstrates that, with diminishing returns to manufacturing, 
moving from an open access regime to optimal management may or may not lead to an 
improvement in welfare.  Such an "immiserizing effect" of a transition from open access to 
optimal management will occur if the demand for the resource good is inelastic so that the value 
of harvested output is less than under open access, and more labor is withdrawn from the 
resource sector.  The imperfection that drives this result is that insiders in the manufacturing 
sector cannot prevent outsiders (formerly harvesting the resource) from spilling into “their 
sector”, adversely affecting the return to their labor.  
 
4. Trade between North and South 
After discussing the extreme cases of the perfect planner and open access, we now turn to a 
series of more complex intermediate cases.  In this section we will present results from models 
with trade between different types of countries; North and South.  North and South are assumed 
to be nearly identical (except perhaps in terms of initial resource stocks) but differ in terms of the 
institutional framework that shapes resource extraction.  In the next section we present the static 
model by Chichilnisky (1994) where the North is assumed to have perfect property rights 
whereas the South has none – section 2 meets section 3.16  In section 4.2 we present a model by 
Karp et al. (2001) where institutions are imperfect in both the North and South, but where the 
common pool externalities are worse in the South because there are more people using the pool.  
The Karp model is based on some different assumptions with respect to utility and production 
than most of the papers in this literature.  This nicely complements the other work, and 
demonstrates that some of the conventional key assumptions are far from innocuous. 
 
4.1 North-South: trade between polar opposite extremes 
Extending the 2 x 2 optimal resource management model to a two-country, or North-South, 2 x 2 
x 2 model does not in itself yield further insights beyond the basic Kemp and Long model 
                                                 
16 Technically speaking, this is not quite true.  Brander and Taylor consider the case of complete open access where 
individual harvesters completely ignore the external costs of their harvesting.  Chichilnisky considers an unregulated 
common property model where individuals take a share of their external costs into account.  The latter collapses to 
the former whenever the number of individuals approaches infinity. 
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discussed previously.  As the authors demonstrate through rigorous proofs, their 2 x 2 optimal 
resource management model, whether applied to exhaustible or renewable resources, is fully 
consistent with standard Hecksher-Ohlin theorems, and is therefore applicable to any number of 
identical countries or regions with identical factor endowments, technologies, preferences and 
institutional arrangements, and which face competitive world factor and goods markets.  
However, a more complex and interesting case arises when we allow for the possibility that there 
are institutional differences between the trading partners.  This is exactly what Chichilnisky 
(1994) does.  She analyzes a North-South model of trade and resource management when the 
two countries are identical except that they differ in the pattern of ownership of an environmental 
resource used as an input to production.  Specifically, resource owners in North have perfect 
property rights whereas management in South is characterized by unregulated common 
property.17 
 The harvested resource does not appear in the utility function directly as a consumption 
good.  Instead, the resource flow serves as an input in the production of two goods A and B.  
Both goods are produced using Leontief or fixed proportions production technologies with the 
harvested resource and another factor (labor or capital) as inputs.  It is assumed that good B is 
more resource-intensive than good A (which is more intensive in the other input).  A key element 
in the model is the following question: how much of the resource is harvested as an intermediate 
input for the production of goods A and B?  For a given resource stock and any given price, 
harvesting will be greater when property rights are weak.  The common property resource supply 
curve lies below the optimal supply curve, implying that resources appear to be more abundant.18  
One major result is that while no trade is necessary for efficiency when the two countries are 
identical,19 trade will nevertheless occur when property-rights regimes differ.  Despite the fact 
that neither country has a real comparative advantage in producing the resource-intensive good, 
the lack of property rights for a property rights for a common-property resource in South leads it 
to produce and export resource-intensive goods in the steady state.  In other words, the country 
                                                 
17 Strictly speaking Chichilnisky does not consider a H-O model as she considers the case where the supply of inputs 
is not given but determined by (relative) prices. 
18 Chichilnisky considers a static model where the harvest function is strictly concave in effort.  In a dynamic setting 
where the resource stock adjusts to harvesting pressures, it can be shown that equilibrium supply is backward 
bending (e.g., Clark 1990). 
19 Note there are no scale economies in production that could make specialization and trade beneficial (e.g., 
Markusen et al. 1997). 
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with weak property rights gains an apparent comparative advantage.  Distortions, rather than true 
economic advantages, trigger and drive trade flows.   
Karp et al (2001, 2003) define the apparent resource stock as δS, where δ is a parameter 
that measures the degree of the distortion (in an unregulated common property, this distortion is 
increasing in the number of people harvesting the resource, hence δ(n) with δ′(n)>0).  In Figure 4 
the direction of trade is illustrated for North and South – two identical economies but possibly 
with different stocks (SN and SS, respectively) and South has imperfect property rights.  The 45 
degrees line (i.e. identical stocks in North and South) defines zero real comparative advantage.  
In contrast, the “no-trade line” defines the case where SN=δSS, or the condition with zero apparent 
advantage.  If the ratio SN/SS is such that the system is above the 45 degrees line, South exports 
the resource-intensive good, and has a true advantage in doing this.  For SN/SS below the “no-
trade line”, North exports the resource intensive good.  For SN/SS between the 45 degrees line and 
the “no-trade line,” the direction of trade will be inefficient as South has an apparent advantage 
and is an exporter of the resource-intensive good, while North has a true advantage. 
If South exports the resource intensive good, the good will be traded at a price below 
social costs, even if factor prices are equal across the world, all markets are competitive.  This 
implies that the country with well-defined resource property rights (the North) ends up over-
consuming the resource-intensive good.  Trade exacerbates a pre-existing distortion, which could 
make the South worse off than under autarky. 
What would happen in a dynamic framework?  Brander and Taylor (1997b) examine the 
case of a two-country model where a country governed by a planner meets a country 
characterized by open access management, and solve for steady states.  While the country 
without property rights may export the resource good (and suffer a welfare loss as discussed in 
section 3) in case of ‘mild overuse,’ a trade reversal is obtained when relative prices give rise to 
‘severe overuse’ in the open access country.  The open access country will first exploit its 
apparent advantage and export the resource good, but following stock depletion will become a 
net importer.  Efficient management in the short run therefore may result in a comparative 
advantage over time.  If this is the case, both countries experience gains from trade. 
 
4.2 Imperfect property rights in North and South 
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Building on Chichilnisky, the model by Karp, Sacheti and Zhao (2001) analyzes a more complex 
case of North–South trade.  The main assumptions differ from those of Chichilnisky in the 
following respects:   
i) Rather than contrasting private property in the North versus unregulated common 
property in the South, the Karp et al model assumes imperfect property rights in both countries.  
While there is no monitoring and enforcement in the North, the common property problem is 
assumed to be more serious in the South because there are more people utilizing the Southern 
pool, shifting the supply curve of harvested resources out as it inflates the apparent stock (given 
an actual certain resource stock S).   
ii) There are two arguments in the utility function; consumption of a subsistence good A 
with unit price and the resource-intensive consumption good (and intermediate input in the 
harvesting process of the resource good) B.  Subsistence good A is assumed to have an income 
elasticity of demand equal to unity for consumption levels below income threshold A*, and an 
income elasticity equal to zero for income levels greater than A*.  That is; any (extra) income 
below the threshold will be spent on the subsistence good A and any income in excess of the 
constraint will be allocated to consumption of B.  
 iii) There are two production factors; the harvested resource flow and some other input 
(which may be labor or capital).  Unlike Chichilnisky, who assumes this factor can be supplied at 
a certain cost, Karp et al assume its availability is exogenously given.  Consistent with earlier 
discussions, let us assume this additional factor is labor. 
The combination of zero substitution in production and consumption, combined with a 
given availability of labor, implies that the model may have multiple stable steady states.  Three 
cases are depicted in Figure 5, graphing the harvesting rate H/S and three realizations of the 
resource growth rate G(S)/S.  The kink in the piecewise linear harvest rate path occurs because of 
the assumption of fixed proportions in production between the inputs “harvested resource” and 
labor.  For resource stocks below the kink (S<Sc), the resource flow is completely employed 
whereas labor is not (a feature not uncommon in some resource dependent communities).  As the 
resource stock increases, so does the associated harvest level.  Imperfect property rights imply 
that, for any given resource stock S<Sc, there will be excessive extraction – too much B will be 
allocated to harvesting and not enough will be consumed.  At threshold level S=Sc labor is fully 
employed and the distortion does not affect supply under autarky.  Further increasing the stock 
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does not trigger more harvesting as there is no labor to match the resource in production—
aggregate harvesting is constant for larger resource stocks, kinking the harvest schedule.  The 
kinked path enables (but does not guarantee) three intersections between harvest and growth.  
For slow (fast) growing resources, the system settles in a unique ‘low’ (‘high’) steady state.  For 
intermediate growth rates, low and high steady states occur simultaneously and initial conditions 
determine the long run outcome of the system.  By shifting the harvest curve up or down, the 
stable steady states shift accordingly – quantitative changes to the system.  However, more 
dramatic outcomes are also possible as equilibria might appear or disappear altogether.20  Cases 
where the system “jumps” from one stable steady state to another (say: from ‘low’ to ‘high,’ or 
vice versa) are interpreted as qualitative changes.  
 What happens when the North and the South move from autarky to trade?  When labor is 
fully employed in both countries, aggregate harvesting is unaffected by trade liberalization,21 but 
the share of extraction is affected – some harvesting will shift from North to South where 
property rights are weaker.  When some labor is unemployed in one of the two trading partners 
under autarky, it is possible that trade increases the aggregate level of extraction as well.22  This 
happens because trade enables countries to re-allocate their production and specialize in those 
products in which they have a comparative advantage.  In other words, the (apparently) resource-
scarce country will specialize in the production of resource-extensive good A.  This might enable 
them to reach a situation where eventually all labor is employed such that aggregate production 
increases. 
 The common theme throughout this survey has been to consider the effects of trade 
liberalization on welfare and stock conservation.  In light of the argument above about multiple 
steady states in autarky, it is perhaps no surprise that there are also multiple stable candidates 
under trade for “intermediate” values of the resource growth as in Figure 5.  Initial conditions 
then determine where the system ‘settles down.”  For resources that grow sufficiently slow (fast), 
                                                 
20 For example, the curves will shift in response to property rights reform.  Karp et al (2003) explore the 
consequences of harmonization of environmental regulation when trade is driven by distortions rather than true 
underlying advantages.  Among other things they show that, while upward harmonization (increasing property rights 
in the South towards the level in the North) is preferable in the long run as it increases the odds of ending up in a 
high steady state, even downward harmonization can be good for welfare. 
21 This is an artifact of the model, following from (i) the assumption that income elasticity of good A is zero, (ii) 
fixed proportions in production and (iii) a fixed total labor stock in both countries. 
22 When some labor is unemployed after trade in both countries, trade does not affect affect production or 
consumption and is irrelevant. 
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there exist a unique equilibrium where some (none) of the labor is unemployed.  In equilibria 
where all labor is employed in both countries, the South with its weak property rights will export 
the resource intensive good, and as a consequence Southern stocks will be lower than under 
autarky.  The reverse holds for Northern stocks. 
 In the short run, where the apparent resource stocks are fixed, trade may affect production 
and consumption, and, hence, welfare.  Trade may trigger an inefficient direction of trade where 
the South exports the resource intensive good because its lax property rights regime provides it 
with a larger apparent stock, even though its actual stock is lower.  If the direction of the trade 
flow is efficient, the volume might still be excessive.  If these effects are sufficiently strong to 
outweigh the usual benefits of trade associated with comparative advantages, trading might 
lower welfare in the South.  These effects have also been identified by Chichilnisky.  But there 
are additional long run effects on the resource stocks to consider as well.  The trade pattern 
identified above might result in a collapse of the local stock, and the South may possibly become 
an importer rather than an exporter of the resource-intensive good  – a reversal in apparent 
comparative advantage.23  This allows the Southern stock to recover, but could also set the stage 
for a phase of resource degradation in the North.  Trade links the dynamics of resource stocks in 
North and South, and the topologies of the general equilibrium may change qualitatively as a 
result.  That is; when resource stocks adjust in the long run, equilibria may appear or disappear. 
Karp, Sacheti and Zhao show that the long run welfare effects of trade are complex and 
ambiguous – there are cases (parameter combinations) where the North pulls up the South so that 
freeing trade eventually makes both countries better off – the economist’s dream scenario.  
Alternatively, there are circumstances where the South drags the North down, such that both 
countries are worse off – the environmentalist’s nightmare.  The latter result is not feasible in a 
model with a rational planner and perfect property rights in the North; one needs a model with 
imperfect property rights in the North.  Of course mixed outcomes are also feasible. Karp et al. 
interpret these results as common ground between free traders and environmentalists; both 
perceptions on the welfare and conservation effects of trade liberalization may be correct and the 
fixed proportions model allows analysts the identify which perspective of the world is likely to 
prevail in specific conditions.  The model suggests a key role for the intrinsic growth rate in this 
                                                 
23 Brander and Taylor (1997b) also obtain this “reversal”. 
 27
respect – for sufficiently low rates (or fragile stocks) the pessimistic outcome is more likely to 
occur.24   
 
5. Endogenous institutions and property rights regimes 
Thus far we have considered the effects of trade liberalization in polar opposite institutional 
settings; the benevolent dictator and the open access or unregulated common property case.25  
Or, put differently, the cases of perfect property rights and no property rights, respectively.  
These all-or-nothing cases are stylized extremes, and “real world harvesting” usually involves 
some intermediate property regime instead.  While resource stocks may be formally owned by 
governments, it is typically the case that private agents do the harvesting.  Firms have an 
incentive to harvest in excess of their quota or underreport their catches when these are taxed.  
The government must devote scarce resources to monitoring and enforcement to ensure that the 
resulting harvest schedule is efficient.  Alternatively, the stock may be owned by a group of users 
who collectively decide on the management of the co-called common pool, but each individual 
has an incentive to cheat and free ride on the other’s conservation efforts.   
We would like to make the following three observations.  First, the degree to which the 
de jure stock owner is willing to monitor and enforce its property rights is determined by relative 
prices and, hence, by the trading regime.  Swanson (1993) and Schulz (1996) have argued that, 
by virtually eliminating the legal value of harvesting, trade bans might result in the cessation of 
all monitoring.  In that case open access “poaching” for an illegal trade or domestic markets will 
ensue such that, from a environmentalist’s perspective, the trade ban might be counterproductive.  
Second, the incentive of individuals and firms to cheat and harvest in excess of agreements (or 
poach when access is denied) is also endogenously determined.  Finally, the effectiveness of 
regulation may be affected by trade as well.  Trade liberalization may expand the set of “outside 
options” for individuals in a common pool, thereby making ostracism a less effective deterrent to 
enforce cooperative extraction from the common pool.   
In other words, trade both impacts on the incentives to cooperate and the incentive to 
regulate – the net effect on the institutional context is unclear a priori.  Because of the many 
                                                 
24 When the rate is very low, however, trade does not harm the economy as the autarky outcomes would also be 
dismal. 
25  With ‘unregulated common property management’ the number of firms exploiting the resource is fixed.  Market 
failure in such a setting is less severe (e.g. Baland and Platteau 1996). 
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possible linkages, there is no escape but to build on formal models to learn what mechanisms 
might exist.  The economics discipline is increasingly attempting to cope with this issue, and in 
this section we will discuss three different approaches.   
 
5.1 Enforcement, profits and welfare 
Suppose a resource stock is formally ‘owned’ by a firm (say, a forest concessionaire or 
landowner extensively managing his land), but that no-encroachment enforcement is costly.  The 
owner must decide whether to invest in securing its property rights, and if so; how much exactly? 
Alternatively, he may allow others to use it under open access conditions and dissipate any rents.  
De Meza and Gould (1992) provide an early and general analysis of the fact that the resource 
must be sufficiently valuable to expend funds on exclusion, monitoring and enforcement.  Hotte 
et al (2000) related this insight to the case of renewable resources and trade.  Households are 
again endowed with a unit of labor that is allocated to either manufacturing or extraction (legal 
or illegal).  In contrast to the Brander and Taylor studies in section 3 (but consistent with 
Hannesson 2000) it is assumed that there are decreasing returns with respect to labor in 
manufacturing.   
Two types of labor may be extracting the same stock—legal and illegal (poaching) labor 
(LH and E, respectively).  The parameter φ measures the strength of enforcement, and with more 
enforcement the return from poaching labor is smaller.  This occurs because poachers have to 
avoid detection by the owner.  It is assumed that only a share (1–φi), where 0 ≤ φ ≤ 1, of the 
poaching labor Ei is effectively geared towards extraction on plot i (owned by firm i).  The firm 
(resource owner) can manipulate parameter φ, by choosing enforcement intensity as this affects 
the precautionary efforts that poachers must incur.  The costs associated with achieving 
enforcement level φ are c(φ) where c′>0 and c′′>0.26 
 Households compare the return to their labor in both activities, and either work in 
manufacturing or legal extraction (with the wage rate determined by the marginal product of 
labor), or in poaching (where labor earns its average product, driven by the sum of legal and 
effective illegal effort).  The firm chooses legal harvesting and enforcement effort.  Both 
variables have in common that they drive out illegal harvesting effort; legal harvests depress the 
average return to labor, and enforcement increases the costs of avoiding detection.  The firm first 
                                                 
26 For additional work along these lines, see Clarke et al. (1993), Bulte and van Kooten (1999). 
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optimally sets its level of enforcement, φ.  Depending on parameters, φ*=0 (true open access) or 
φ*>0.27  Next, the firm decides about the hiring of legal labor.  For the case where φ*=0, firms 
do not bother to employ anybody as there are no rents to be gained from (legal) harvesting.  In 
contrast, when φ*>0 legal labor is employed up to the level where it exactly crowds out poaching 
– the entry-deterrence employment level involving rent dissipation for poachers but positive 
profits for the firm (whose laborers are more productive as they don’t worry about detection).  
While the latter outcome generates positive profits for the firm, it is shown that enforcing 
property rights may involve a welfare loss at the level of society as a whole.  Enforcement of 
private property rights implies that labor switches to manufacturing (depressing its marginal 
return which implies a fall in labor income) and also involves enforcement costs.28  Since the 
effect of enforcement on labor income in manufacturing is external to the firm it does not affect 
its optimal enforcement stringency.  The firm only compares gross profits and private 
enforcement costs. 
 Under autarky, firms may set φ*=0 or φ*>0, depending on key parameters.  Assume that 
firm do not bother to enforce their property rights such that de facto extraction takes place under 
conditions of open access.  How does opening up for trade affect the firm’s enforcement 
decision?  The authors find that the firm’s optimal level of enforcement is increasing in the 
resource price and decreasing in the prevailing wage rate.  Hence, when resource prices increase 
as a result of trade liberalization, the firm may suddenly find enforcement privately profitable 
and respond by switching from φ*=0 to φ*>0.  The firm will hire some poachers and others will 
be forced into manufacturing.  Profits of the firm increase but, as outlined above, welfare in 
society as a whole may fall – another example of immiserizing trade.  Hotte and co-authors also 
analyse a more involved dynamic model where the resource stock contracts or grows in response 
to natural growth and harvesting.  They show that the increase in enforcement brought about by 
higher price raises equilibrium stock levels.  Endogenizing property rights thus opens the 
possibility that trade might be good for conservation and bad for welfare – reversing some of the 
insights of section 2. 
                                                 
27 The owner will set φ*=0 if enforcement combined with the hiring of legal labor to deter entry by poachers earns 
negative profits.  In contrast, if enforcement plus entry deterrence employment earns positive profits, the owner will 
set φ*>0. 
28 For more information on comparing income under open access and private property, see Weitzman (1974) and De 
Meza and Gould (1987, 1992). 
 30
 
5.2 Trade and common pool management 
The analysis in 5.1 was based on the assumption that an owner can raise the costs of illegal 
extraction by raising the effort that poachers must incur in order to avoid detection.  Nobody ever 
gets caught and punished because either there is no enforcement and all harvesting is “illegal” 
(φ*=0, LH=0), or all illegal harvesting is crowded out (φ*>0, E=0).  Copeland and Taylor choose 
another perspective.  They assume imperfect enforcement by the resource owner, and recognize 
that individuals may have an incentive to harvest illegally (or harvest in excess of an agreed-
upon quota), but must balance the gains from “cheating” against the expected penalties if caught.  
Consider the familiar case where there is a single production factor (labor) that is 
allocated between CRS manufacturing or resource extraction from a common pool.  Unlike in 
the earlier work of Brander and Taylor (1997), Copeland and Taylor assume the presence of a 
benevolent resource manager or village elder that sets rules on resource use to maximize steady 
state utility of the group.  The manager decides how much labor households can spend in the 
common resource (say l*), and attempts to enforce its rule by monitoring the behavior of the 
group members (which translates into a certain probability of detection; ρ).  Next, individuals 
have to decide whether to behave in accordance with the rule (l=l*) or allocate extra labor (l>l*) 
to harvesting.  If too much time is spent in the commons, households run the risk of being 
detected (probability ρ, independent of the extent of cheating).  If this happens, the household is 
ostracised and is denied access to the common again.  Cheating households that are caught 
should support themselves by working in manufacturing henceforth.29  Assume the resource 
stock is large enough to make extraction more profitable than manufacturing. 
The trade off that households make is relatively straightforward.  Adhere to the rules and 
earn some income in extraction and some in manufacturing.  Alternatively, it is possible to take a 
risk and cheat by spending all the time in the common (recall the detection probability is 
assumed independent of the degree of violation, hence a maximum violation is optimal when 
cheating).  The optimal choice depends on comparing the expected present value of income from 
                                                 
29 Note the difference with the model of Hotte et al. (2002) where the resource owner tried to drive out illegal effort 
by reducing the return to poaching (by increasing legal harvesting or enforcement).  Copeland and Taylor, instead, 
focus on the disciplining effect of punishment, which depends on the foregone profits of working in the commons 
relative to the wage in manufacturing. 
 31
these options.  Formally, the discounted benefits of not cheating in the current period are defined 
as: 
(12) VN(t) = [ph* + (1–l*)w]dt + (1–rdt) VR(t+dt), 
where h*=ql*S is the harvest associated with the allowed time in the common, w is the wage rate 
in manufacturing and VR is the (unrestricted) continuation value.  The latter might differ from the 
benefits of cooperation since playing by the rules in the current period leaves all options open for 
the future (including cheating).  Future benefits are discounted.  The benefits of cheating in the 
current period: 
(13) VC(t) = (pqS)dt + (1–rdt) [ρdtVM(t+dt) + (1-ρdt)VR(t+dt)], 
where VM is the present value of working in manufacturing henceforth.  Note from (12) that 
cheaters who are not caught have the same set of options for the future as those who abided by 
the rules.  From the above, these options are defined as VR(t)  = max[VN(t),VC(t)].  Comparing the 
benefits and losses from cheating (or the costs associated with ostracism) defines a forward- 
looking incentive constraint.  The manager must choose l* such that this incentive constraint is 
satisfied, otherwise people will rationally choose to ignore the rules.  After some manipulation, 









When resource rents are positive (pqS-w>0), this condition simply implies l*>r/(r+ρ) or the 
allowable harvest should be sufficiently large to deter cheating.  The threshold level is composed 
of parameters reflecting impatience and the probability of detection.  However, there is no 
guarantee that the rents associated with such a policy will be positive (i.e. pqS>w).  When the 
returns of harvesting according to the threshold fall below those in manufacturing, people will 
switch their occupation.  If we define the open access allocation of labor to the common as LO, 














where N is the number of households in the village.  The planner takes the incentive constraint 
into account when formulating a policy that will not be violated. There are three possibilities.  
First, the incentive constraint is not binding and no individual is tempted to increase his harvest 
effort when aggregate harvesting is at the optimal level.  The outcome is conventional first best 
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management as outlined in section 2.  Second, the incentive constraint binds even as the system 
approaches open access harvesting.  This may happen when the resource good’s price is very low 
so that L0 is small and lower than the other term in brackets in (15). The planner is not able to re-
direct the allocation of labor from harvesting to manufacturing and the outcome is as modelled in 
section 3.  Depending on key parameters, notably the growth rate, catchability coefficient, 
detection and death rates, and the size of the human population, such an outcome may be 
temporary (that is; depending on relative prices) or permanent.  Finally, and most interestingly, it 
may be the case that the incentive constraint binds in steady state while there are positive profits 
associated with current harvesting.  This yields an intermediate allocation of labor and 
intermediate level of stock depletion (between first best and open access), and defines a 
‘constrained optimum.’  The institutional context thus defined therefore measures whether it is 
feasible and necessary for an imperfectly informed planner to constrain agents’ harvesting.  
 How does trade fit into this analysis?  Copeland and Taylor distinguish between three 
different categories of countries; (i) countries who are never able to move beyond open access 
harvesting, (ii) countries who might secure some form of a “constrained optimal regime” if the 
conditions are favorable, and (iii) countries that achieve the fully efficient outcome given the 
right set of parameters.  If moving from autarky to trade increases the price of the resource good, 
countries of category (ii) and (iii) can move from open access to limited property rights.  If prices 
rise further, category (iii) countries can even make the final step to the full cooperative outcome 
(and categories from the other categories will not become worse off).  The reason for this 
transition to happen is that rising prices trigger a flow of labor entering the resource sector and a 
fall of the stock.  Eventually, for category (ii) and (iii) countries, both arguments in (4) are of 
equal size and the incentive constraint begins to bind.  Depending on whether the first best 
allocation of labor to the common pool L* is greater or smaller than N[r/(ρ+r)] for any arbitrarily 
high value of p, the country can reach the first best (or not).  For L*> N[r/(ρ+r)], first best 
harvesting can be sustained while meeting the incentive constraint. 
 Consistent with Hotte et al (2002), Copeland and Taylor also find that a country can have 
open access harvesting or (limited) control over harvesting, depending on the price of the 
resource good.  Raising the value of the stock provides the incentive to generate rents from 
harvesting.  Transition towards controlled harvesting is facilitated by rapid replenishment of the 
stock, good detection possibilities ρ and a small size of the group N.  The key insight of these 
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models is that observing conditions of de facto open access under autarky need not imply equally 
wasteful management under trade.  Trade may be pre-condition for management reform, and 
arguing the other way around might be counterproductive.  Yet, they also warn that some 
countries (category 1 countries) will not benefit from trade-induced higher prices.  These 
countries will “lose” as spelled out in section 3. 
 
5.3 Trade and corruption  
In the previous two sub-sections we explored the possibility that higher prices for resource 
commodities might result in more efficient management.  Implicitly it was assumed that 
harvesters do not change their behavior, other than intensifying their extraction effort in response 
to higher prices.  But typically harvesters have additional instruments at their disposal, other than 
harvest effort.  For example, harvesters might organize themselves and lobby for more lenient 
regulation.  Alternatively, they may bribe planners for special favors in their pursuit of resource 
rents.  Corruption is increasingly recognized as a major issue in “real world” management of 
resources like oil fields (Karl 1997) and forests (Ross 2001), and analyzing the consequences of 
trade liberalization on the incentive to bribe therefore is important. 
 For economists, the static common agency model by Grossman and Helpman (1994) 
provides a logical starting point to consider this issue.  In this model, a self-interested planner 
maximizes a linear objective function that includes social welfare (W) and bribes from interest 
groups (T) as arguments, and a linear welfare weight to quantify tradeoffs between them:   
(16)  Max Π = [αW + (1-θ)T], 
where Π represents the objective for the planner, and θ is the weight of welfare in the planner’s 
objective function.  In the sections with a planner thus far we implicitly assumed that α=1 and 
that the planner only has eye for the social good.  This is clearly unrealistic, certainly for many 
resource rich countries, as is readily gleaned from the various corruption indices that are 
available (e.g. World Bank governance indicators or Transparency International data).   
There are multiple interest groups in society – say: resource firms versus 
environmentalists – “bidding” on a menu of possible policies announced by the planner.  In the 
first stage of the game the lobby groups offer the government a so-called bribe schedule that 
links bribes to the policies implemented.  In the second stage, the government chooses the 
‘optimal’ policy, taking objective function (16) and bribe schedules as given, and collects the 
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bribes.  In the third stage production and consumption take place, taking environmental policies 
as given.  The model should be solved through backward induction. 
In other words, there exists a political market where policies are exchanged for bribes, 
and where the sum of bribes is balanced against welfare.  The welfare weight θ is typically 
assumed constant, and may be interpreted as a measure of corruption in the economy – the lower 
θ, the more corrupt is the planner.  Interestingly, empirical work by Leite and Weidmann (1999) 
suggests that the extent of corruption is increasing in natural resource abundance.  Given positive 
values of θ, more extensive lobbying translates into more distorted policies, steering the 
economy further away from the first best allocation of factors.  In the context of resource 
economics, firms may have incentives to bribe the planner to pay lower taxes or receive more 
generous harvest quota.   
Assume resource firms lobby for extending the harvest quota beyond the socially optimal 
quota.  Privately optimal quota might diverge from socially optimal ones because firms and 
planner apply a different discount rate, or because there are external effects in harvesting or 
conservation.  As demonstrated by Bernheim and Whinston (1986), the Nash equilibrium 
outcome is characterized by two conditions: (1) maximization of the government objective 
function, and (2) maximization of the joint utilities of lobby groups and planner.  This implies 
that outcomes on the political market are locally truthful, or that the firm’s willingness to pay 
(bribe) is increasing in the policy’s benefits.  Outcomes are on the bargaining frontier and are 
Pareto efficient in the sense that no actor (lobby group or otherwise) can be made better off 
without making someone else worse off. 
Since the firm’s benefits of securing a larger quota are increasing in the resource price, 
the equilibrium transfer from firm to planner is determined by this price too.  When trade 
liberalization changes relative prices it affects political pressures and, hence, the balance on the 
political market.  Following this reasoning, a resource abundant country that opens up for trade 
will experience an increase in lobbying and, as a result, larger quotas (in the short run) at the 
detriment of welfare and stock conservation – another example of endogenous institutions.30  
                                                 
30 Leite and Weidmann (1999) also consider the effect of opening up for trade on corruption, and find a reverse 
effect – more ‘open’ economies are typically characterized by less extensive corruption.  Trade regulations (as 
occurring at intermediate levels of ‘trade openness’) are a source of rents and thereby trigger further bribing (see 
also Baland and Francois 2000).  Removing such regulations lowers the potential for rent seeking and corruption, 
and provides a force that works in an opposite direction from the ‘price effect’ of trade liberalization discussed in the 
main text. 
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While this effect has yet to be analyzed fully in the context of resource management, such an 
approach could yield similar insights as studies of the relation between pollution, trade and 
corruption.31 
However, the interaction effects between corruption, trade and resource conversion can 
also be complex.  For example, a recent cross-country analysis of the economic factors 
underlying tropical deforestation and agricultural land expansion indicates that the influence of 
corruption on land conversion may depend on what happens to a country’s terms of trade as well 
as its degree of resource dependency (Barbier 2004).  The presence of significant interaction 
effects between the terms of trade and corruption and primary product export dependency 
suggest caution in assuming that an important policy mechanism by which the rest of the world 
can reduce land conversion in developing economies is through sanctions, taxation and other 
trade interventions that reduce the terms of trade of these economies. 
Such a finding is consistent with the theoretical models reviewed here.  Throughout this 
paper we have noted that the impact of higher prices on the institutional setting is ambiguous: 
while the ‘optimal enforcement models’ in sections 5.1 and 5.2 implied that higher prices may 
result in more efficient resource management, corruption is a force that may pull in an opposite 
direction.  By enhancing the incentive to bribe, greater corruption may cause deviations from 
optimal management.  In such a sub-optimal world, it is difficult to predict how trade 




This paper has provided only a brief overview of the literature on trade and renewable resource 
management.  The key motivation for the paper is the lack of consensus between economists and 
environmentalists about the desirability of international trade, and that these opposing views 
                                                 
31 While we cannot do justice to the rapidly growing field of corruption and environmental regulation, we can 
highlight a few examples.  Evidently, corruption enables firms to evade stringent regulation by paying a bribes 
rather than abating emissions (Pargal et al 1996).  Lopez and Mitra (2000) consider the effect effect of corruption on 
the relation between income and pollution levels and find that both the level and ‘turning point’ of the EKC are 
affected by the degree of corruptability; Frederiksson and Svensson (2003) analyze the relation between corruption, 
political instability and environmental policy; Damania et al (2003) find a negative direct effect of corruption on the 
standard for lead content in gasoline (as well as an interaction effect between trade openness and corruption); and 
Frederiksson et al (2004) analyze the effects of corruption and industry size on energy policy outcomes (finding that 
policy stringency is inversely related to corruptability and positively related to lobbying costs, and that capitalists 
and workers lobbying efforts are negatively related). 
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offer different recommendations for reform of WTO policies.  While many economists argue that 
trade is not the issue, and that domestic and international institutions for environmental 
management should be strengthened if resource conservation is a goal, environmentalists often 
take the opposite stand and argue the case for severely restricting and regulating trade to protect 
biodiversity and critical renewable resource stocks. 
 We organized the paper such that it loosely followed the main developments in the 
literature.  The guiding principle in structuring the literature is the changing perspective on the 
role of institutions in resource management.  In the 1970s and 1980s, following standard models 
in resource economics, most of the work assumed the perspective of a benevolent planner or sole 
owner with full property rights.  In the 1990s, with the increasing recognition of the implications 
for resource management of open access resource extraction, more attention was given to the 
second-best setting where property rights are either de facto or de jure absent.  More recent 
contributions treat the institutional context as endogenous, and model the incentives and 
constraints that agents have at the micro level to influence resource management outcomes.   
 Our summary of the literature suggests a very mixed overall picture, both in terms of 
welfare and effects on stock conservation.  While generally it is possible to obtain relatively 
clean results for the polar extreme cases of perfect management and open access, it is evident 
that more realistic assessments generally imply ambiguous outcomes.  The interplay of 
economic, ecological and institutional variables therefore determines whether trade is overall 
“good” or “bad”, which provides quite a bit of common ground between economists and 
environmentalists.  This has important implications for international policymaking concerned 
with trade and renewable resource management issues.  Neither the “conventional” view of 
economists that trade impacts on resource management can safely be ignored, nor the equally 
“simplistic” view of environmentalists that trade is the source of resource losses and must 
therefore be curbed, is a good starting point for recommending specific trade policies and 
reforms for most of the pressing biodiversity and renewable resource management problems 
facing the world today.  While trade restrictions and impediments lower welfare in a first best 
world, it is evident that export and import measures may promote welfare in exporting countries 
when, say, enforcement of property rights is imperfect.  The presence of international nonuse 
values associated with resource conservation, of spillover regulatory benefits, may perhaps also 
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justify trade interventions on certain occasions (albeit clearly not a first-best approach to 
maximize global welfare). 
Space limitations do not permit a thorough treatment of trade policy (but see Anderson 
and Blackhurst 1992; Barbier and Rauscher 1994; Barbier et al. 1990 and 1994; Schulz 1996, 
Brander and Taylor 1998, and others).  While tariffs for most resource commodities have 
declined, there is evidence that non-tariff measures continue to play a large role in shaping trade 
patterns (Barbier 2001; Bourke and Leitch 2000).  Tariff escalation – higher rates on higher 
levels of procession – is also still exerting an influence on the structure of resource sector in 
developing countries.32  However, whether the net welfare effects of such distortions are positive 
or negative is hard to determine in general.  It appears as if each specific management problem, 
whether it be control of ivory poaching, tropical forest conservation, fisheries management, 
protection of endangered species or preservation of biodiversity “hot spots”, must be analyzed on 
a case by case basis in order to determine the linkages between the key economic, ecological and 
institutional factors that are driving the problem.  Only through such careful analysis can the 
impacts of trade and resource management and economic welfare be identified, and only then 
can possible policy recommendations be identified.   
In conducting this summary of the economics literature on trade and renewable resources, 
we are aware that new developments are already occurring in this rapidly evolving literature.  
Several additional research topics have a direct bearing on the focus of the current paper, but 
cannot be addressed here for reasons of space.  One example is the risk and welfare impacts 
posed by biological invasions, or “bioinvasions”.  Trade typically involves transport, which 
implies the risk of introducing non-native species.  Managing this complex and unpredictable 
issue has recently received ample attention (e.g. Barbier and Shogren 2004; Horan et al, 2002, 
McAusland and Costello 2004), and will likely continue to be a topic of interest for some time.  
Another example is the effect of trade on habitat and biodiversity.  If trade triggers specialization 
and if this in turn impacts on land use (e.g. forestry versus agricultural land use options) then 
                                                 
32 For example, consider the case of forest commodities.  Rates for most forest products are 5% or lower, but rates 
for processed goods like plywood are typically 10-15%.  Tariff escalation discourages local processing, negatively 
affecting the scope for investment and industrialization in exporting countries, and the ability of exporters to capture 
a larger share of the value added associated with processing resource commodities.  Depending on linkages and 
scale economies (as well as alternative employment and investment opportunities in the economy, and the 
institutional context within which harvesting takes place), this may or may not seriously affect the scope for 
modernization.  There are cases where tariff escalation has been countered by export bans of unprocessed 
commodities.  Often such efforts to promote industrialization have spurred inefficient and uncompetitive industries. 
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trade liberalization can be linked to biodiversity loss through the so-called species-area curve 
(Polasky et al. 2004).  Recent research also suggests that ecolabeling is relevant in the context of 
trade and resource management (e.g., Swallow and Sedjo 2002, Nunes and Riyanto 2001).  In the 
context of an information problem, ecolabeling allows consumers to identify the environmentally 
friendly (e.g. “sustainably managed”) alternatives and express their preference for such 
commodities.  It also enables complying producers to earn a green premium, although evidence 
of such premiums for sustainably produced timber and biodiversity-friendly shade-grown coffee 
is modest (Barbier 2001; Nunes and Riyanto 2001).  Another issue that has recently been 
explored is the interaction between wild species, stockpiled commodities from the wilds, and the 
impact of legalized trade from ex situ stocks on the incentive to poach (Kremer and Morcom 
2000) and coordinate on extinction scenarios (Bulte et al 2003). 
Finally, we will briefly mention a few issues that have received little attention in the 
literature thus far, and that could possibly be of interest to consider in the future.  First, since 
trade liberalization affects factor flows it is relevant to know how such flows affect factor 
income in the non-resource sector (e.g. de Meza and Gould 1992).  The literature is silent on 
increasing returns to scale at firm or sector level, but exploring this possibility would link the 
literature with that on trade and pollution (Neary 1999) and the so-called “resource curse” 
(Matsuyama 1992, Sachs and Warner 1997).  As discussed above in the context of Matusyama’s 
model, when labor flows out of manufacturing, as will be the case for a resource-abundant 
country that opens for trade, scale economies will lower income in manufacturing.  If external 
linkages are strong enough, this effect can dominate any gains from trade.  Conversely, when 
trade triggers an inflow of factors, for example because of enhanced enforcement in the resource 
sector, this brings a positive welfare effect.  
Other overlooked issues thus far include the simple observation that most models do not 
consider more than one production factor (labor) in addition to the resource stock or flow, and 
that key results can change when we distinguish between multiple factors. The distinction 
between mobile and immobile factors (capital versus labor) also seems apt – a questionable 
simplification in light of evidence that, for example, international logging firms are ‘footloose’ 
(Marchak 1995).  In a similar vein, the effect of trade on investment, technology diffusion and 
capital accumulation is relevant.  Trade may also impact on preferences for nature conservation 
through the impact on income, as demand for conversation has always been considered income 
 39
elastic.  Imperfect competition and strategic interaction between jurisdictions sharing access to 
common stocks or output markets has yet to be analyzed (see Ruseski (1998) for such a model 
that does not involve trade).  Finally, empirical work seems to lag far behind theory.  It appears 
as if the literature on trade and resource management has only just begun. 
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Figure 3. Open Access Resource Exploitation and Trade in a Resource-Abundant Economy 
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Figure 4: Trade Patterns between North and South  







































Figure 5: Harvesting and growth in the absence of substitution possibilities 
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